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When taken from a domestic viewpoint, the primary gold market appears to be
noncompetitive and marred by concentration. However, when seen at the
global scale, it is clear that the primary gold market is competitive and diluted.
Further, even if the primary market were noncompetitive and concentrated at
the global level, that market probably could not readily affect the price of gold.
Regardless of competitiveness, gold mines in the United States and elsewhere
are subject to environmental and safety regulations that increase the cost of
production; Regulations are stringently enforced in the United States as
compared to competitor countries, potentially creating a competitive
disadvantage for US primary producers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Gold markets have been regulated for at least five thousand years—since the
first dynastic ruler of Egypt, Menes, declared that the value of gold would be
two and a half times that of silver.1 The market has arisen in different areas at
different times, with distinct civilizations discovering, exploiting, and coveting
gold from the days of their earliest records.
America has been no exception, and the United States has been a
major consumer of gold since its inception. The U.S. has also produced gold,
beginning in 1799 when the young son of Hessian-turned-farmer John Reed
found a seventeen-pound nugget while bow fishing on his father’s North
Carolina land.2 This discovery led to the creation of placer associations and
mining cohorts in the Colonies – Appalachian organizations that dominated
gold production in the United States until January 1848, when California Gold
Rush started at the American River.3
Once mining came to California in earnest, it spread throughout the
American West, from Alaska to New Mexico and Oregon to Colorado.
Wherever there were mountains and streams, there were miners and gold
pans. Solo miners and small teams did their best to gather the easy pickings
from streams and veins, but “[b]y the early twentieth century, the best high-
grade deposits of precious metals were either exhausted or being worked
1 O. E. Young, Jr., The Southern Gold Rush, 1828–1836, 48 J. of South Hist. 373, 375 (1982).
2 Id. at 373.
3
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out,”4 and mining became more capital-intensive. The need for capital moved
mining away from a collection of individual miners to the formation of
companies. Luckily, this time of needed capital struck during the Second
Industrial Revolution, a period that saw the harnessing of hydraulic, electrical,
steam, and internal combustion power. These new technologies allowed
mining companies to dig deeper than ever, to dredge stream beds, to
communicate with far-flung operations, and to transport capital to mines and
ore away from them. 
Consequently, technological innovation has been the key to gold
mining in the last 100 years. From cutting mountainsides with pressurized
water, to blasting tunnels with TNT, and – most importantly – to extracting
gold from hard rock through the cyanidation and active-carbonation
processes, new technologies have led to enormous startup costs and, therefore,
huge mining conglomerates looking to exploit economies of scale. The
benefits of scope economies have also arisen: since mining one mineral can
lead to discovery of another, and the equipment and know-how used to dig
one mineral can be used to dig another, mines often employ their expertise
and equipment to gather gold while mining something else – or vice versa.5
Technological necessity has made size the watchword of modern
economically-sustainable gold mining. Enormous haul trucks, excavators,
underground facilities, open pits, and mills are getting bigger every year to
make up for decreases in ore grade. Today, a mine can stay operable even at
grades of one-hundredth of an ounce per ton of ore, but the capital costs that
allow for such operations are astronomical: up to two billion dollars per mine
for startup costs alone.6 It is true that entry into the gold primary market is
relatively easy if a high-grade deposit can be extracted with minimal effort
(e.g, artisanal sluice mining in Alaska), but such deposits are increasingly
scarce and often run dry after a short extraction period. In other words, these
deposits are too small, too easily depleted, and too scattered to support long-
term, large-scale operations.7 Indeed, the average ore grade of large
operations is 3 grams per ton, which leads to a cost per ounce of gold of
between $300 and $400 at well-capitalized firms. Experts agree that as time
marches on, ore grade will generally decrease and cost of production will
increase on an exponential curve.8 Indeed, there is a very high long-run
4 M. Malone, The Collapse of Western Metal Mining: An Historical Epitaph 55 Pacific Hist. Rev. 455, 458
(1986).
5 The Bingham Canyon Mine in Utah, for example, is a Kennecott Copper mine that supplements its copper
production by finding gold in the process. As shown in Table 1, Kennecott copper is one of the top four
gold producers in the United States, due almost entirely to its Bingham Canyon Mine, which produces
12,300 kg of gold per year (the seventh largest gold-producing mine in the U.S.).
6 J.H. Morris, Going for the Gold: The History of Newmont Mining Corporation (Univ. of Al. Press 2010).
7 Datamonitor, Ref. Code 0199-2063, Industry Profile: Global Gold 14 (2010).
8 J. Muller & H.E. Frimmel, Numerical Analysis of Historic Gold Production Cycles and Implications for
Future Sub-Cycles, 4 Open Geology J. 30–31 (2010).
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minimum efficient scale at modern mines that is going to get higher.9 This will
force small firms to either bow out as soon as their high-grade ore is gone, or
accept a takeover bid by a better-capitalized firm. 
2. PRODUCT MARKET IS BOTH DOMESTIC AND 
GLOBAL
The relevant product in this analysis is primary gold, meaning gold extracted
from the ground in order to be sold. This is in contrast with secondary gold,
which is produced by recycling scrap – a method that took hold in the mid-
1960s and has resulted in secondary production rivaling the size of primary
output.10 Although my concentration is on the primary market, the secondary
market produces a significant amount of world supply (or, more appropriately,
its re-supply). The gold produced in the secondary market is indistinguishable
from that produced in the primary market. Thus, I cannot altogether ignore the
secondary market – or gold sold on the market by central banks and others – in
the following discussion. Most gold mining companies are not involved in the
refining processes directly. Instead, gold mines take the refining process to
about 80–90% purity on-site, forming the gold into doré bars and sending them
to external refineries that take the bars to 99.6–99.99% pure bullion.11 In
addition to this break in vertical integration, I assume that gold mining
companies are not involved in recycling.
Geographically, the market has both domestic and global aspects.
Although gold is bought and sold globally, making concentration and
competition analyses tempting from the world-level, its production is
intimately connected to countries’ land. Thus, individual countries have a
stake in how their gold is mined and how mining affects their economy. From
a regulatory standpoint, many statutes (such as the General Mining Act of
1872) and the common law are generally applicable to all gold mining
9 It must be noted that large mining corporations appear to be waiting to enter some countries for political
and governmental-efficiency reasons rather than ore grade. These countries’ rich resources are currently
exploited by small-scale firms. China is the poster-child of such countries, in which one state-supported
producer mines about 20% of all reserves, while innumerable small firms make up the difference. See
generally, L. Tole & G. Koop, Do Environmental Regulations Affect the Location Decisions of
Multinational Gold Mining Firms? (12 August, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
University of Strathclyde).
10 United States Geological Survey, 2007 Minerals Yearbook: Gold 31.9 (2008).
11 J. Marsden & I. House, The Chemistry of Gold Extraction 449 (2nd Ed., Society for Mining Metallurgy &
Exploration 2006). There is a good possibility that gold mines will begin vertical integration with
dedicated refineries (“i.e.”, refineries that take the gold to maximum purity), especially as gold in
circulation (and therefore available for recycling) increases and the gold in the ground decreases. A move
on the large scale would lead to more of a possibility that firms could exercise market power. One South
African gold mining company, Harmony, has already integrated, and takes its gold from ore to 99.99%
purity on its own. See R. Short & B. Radebe, Gold in South Africa (2008), available at http://
www.goldinsouthafrica.co.za.It must also be noted that at least some dedicated refineries are owned by a
conglomerate of nearby gold mines. Id.
120       UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LAW JOURNAL                                DECEMBER 2010
operations in the U.S.12 Thus, since both perspectives can be valuable in
creating policy that affects primary production, I examine both the United
States and global mining industries.
3. THE DOMESTIC PRIMARY MARKET APPEARS 
HIGHLY CONCENTRATED
Technology, capital, and large firms seem necessary to keep up with demand.
Since gold is sold on a global market both as an investment and as an input,
each gold-producing country (unless centrally-planned) is both an exporter and
an importer of gold. The United States was, from 1900 to the early 1960s,
generally a net importer of gold. Since then, the U.S. has been, almost without
exception, a net exporter.13 In 1971, Richard Nixon deregulated the gold
market by removing the United States from the gold standard. This move led
to an immediate jump in prices, which further led, in the 1980s, to a production
level more than four times that of 1971. United States production continued to
grow throughout the 1980s and 1990s, peaking at 366 metric tons in 1998 and
then tapering off as prices began falling. Production has steadily fallen since
2001 despite rising prices, and in 2008 the United States primary producers
generated only 233 tons of gold. Notably, the 2008 price of gold was the
highest it had been since 1987, but the American production level was the
lowest it had been since 1988.14
Today, gold is produced at only about fifty-five mines in the United
States, with 78% of all gold production coming from the state of Nevada.15
Thirteen gold producers owning thirty mines make up over 99% of total U.S.
gold production (see Table 1). Among these producers, Barrick Gold
Corporation has the largest market share, at 37.8%, followed by Newmont
Mining Corporation, at 29.5%. As shown in Table 1, the market is highly
concentrated, with an HHI of 2521.06 and the top four firms holding more
than 85% of the market. Barrick and Newmont have for years been major
players in American gold mining (although they were accompanied by other
similar-sized firms until the early 2000s)16 and show no signs of slowing.
12 It should be pointed out, however, that U.S. courts are not shy about finding jurisdiction over companies
that affect American interests – even when the case has more effects in foreign jurisdictions. See
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v Anglo American Corp., 698 F. Supp 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (1989) (finding
personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Luxembourg (Minorco) corporation and its hostile takeover
bid for a British (Consolidated Gold Fields – plaintiff) corporation, because the merger would have
created a 32% market share for the new company and because the new company would have minority
control over some American mines). 
13 United States Geological Survey, Gold Statistics (2009), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/ds/2005/
140/gold.pdf.
14 Id.
15 United States Geological Survey, supra note 10, at 31.1
16 M. Callahan, To Hedge or Not to Hedge ... That Is the Question: Empirical Evidence from the North
American Gold Mining Industry 1996-2000, 11 Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 271
(2002).
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Indeed, it could be argued that the primary gold market in the United States is
likely subject to collusion among the top producers: Barrick and Newmont
would have a majority market share if taken together. However, this argument
would overlook the global market in which these companies play. Prices are
set at a global scale; thus, while it is true that the top producers could leverage
market power if they were only competing domestically, I now turn to the
competitive landscape at the global level to see this seemingly bleak picture in
a larger context. 
4. GLOBAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR 
GOLDPREVENT PRIMARY PRODUCERS FROM 
EXERCISING PRICING POWER 
The global market is much less concentrated than the domestic scene. The
global primary gold market produced 2,380,000 kilograms of gold in 2007 (a
number that stayed relatively constant through 2009), meaning that United
Company Gold Production
(kg)
% Mkt Share (% Mkt Share)
Barrick 90611 37.8 1428.84
Newmont 70788 29.5 870.25
Kinross 28800 12 144
Kennecott 15372 6.4 40.96
Creek 8770 3.7 13.69
Teck 8080 3.4 11.56
Goldcorp 4380 1.8 3.24
Yukon 3790 1.6 2.56
Quadra 3360 1.4 1.96
Wharf 1800 1 1
Coeur d’Alene 1570 1 1
Jipangu 1360 1 1
Apollo 1040 1 1
239.721 HHI: 2521.06
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States gold production consisted of only 10% of the global market.17 On a
global level, Barrick is the largest producer with a 10.2% market share –
meaning that Barrick alone produces as much as all U.S. mines combined – but
its market share is far from overbearing. Newmont is the second-largest
producer, at 8.9%.18 AngloGold Ashanti and Gold Fields follow, at 6.0% and
4.7%, respectively. In other words, at the global level, the four-firm
concentration ratio is only 29.8% – hardly a number that should raise
regulatory red flags. Thus, given that American gold production is merely a
facet in the larger market – within which every producer in the world competes
– the fact that domestic gold production is focused in the hands of a few is
meaningless from a price-fixing standpoint; the closest to market power that
domestic firms could come, would be to hold vast deposits and mine them only
when prices are high.
There have been recent murmurings of a Barrick-Newmont merger,
and most industry commentators predict that the two will enjoy “operational
synergies” – if not merger itself – within the next few years.19 Barrick, a
Toronto-based company, has 26 operations scattered among the U.S.,
Australia, Canada, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Tanzania.20 Newmont, a
Denver-based company, has gold operations in the U.S., Australia, Canada,
Peru, Indonesia, Ghana, New Zealand, and Mexico. Thus, in the U.S.,
Australia, Canada, and Peru, these two companies could share resources and
operations and possibly benefit from a merger. The merger of these two
industry leaders could—if the agreement were to leave all mines operational –
lead to a single firm with almost 20% market share. Such a merger of the
industry’s top two firms might look suspect at first glance, but would not
likely have an appreciable effect on the market because the price and quantity
of gold on the global market is out of all primary producers’ hands – not just
Barrick’s and Newmont’s. Indeed, the inability of primary producers to affect
price, and their hedging against price fluctuations, is well-documented.21
A. Beyond Primary Production
Supply to the global market comes from primary producers, secondary
producers, central banks, and anyone else who has gold and wants to sell it. The
price of gold is fixed twice daily by the London Bullion Exchange,22 and this
price is used as the benchmark for transactions in gold and gold derivatives all
17 Datamonitor, supra note 7, at 10.
18 Id. at 12.
19 See, “e.g.”, D. Kasich, Newmont, Barrick Contemplate Operational Synergies, not Merger,
MINEWEB.COM, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page34?oid=80653&sn=Detail.
20 DATAMONITOR, supra note 7, at 20.
21 See, “e.g”, M. Callahan, supra note 16 (detailing the hedging practices, such as long-term contracts, of
primary producers in North America).
22 See the London Gold Fix home page, http://www.goldfixing.com/home.htm.
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around the world. If primary producers such as Barrick and Newmont were the
only players in the market, their joint action could affect the price fixed by the
Exchange. However, secondary producers add millions of kilograms of gold to
the market every year (over 1.2 million in 2008 and increasing at a rate of more
than 25% per year).23 In other words, the size of primary producers would
probably have to be unforeseeably enormous (or they would have to organize
a widespread cartel) before they could begin controlling prices on the global
market. 
Central banks, such as the United States Federal Reserve (of which
most is held at the New York Branch), hold approximately 19% of all of the
gold ever mined, or 31,350,000 kg. They primarily use these reserves to
guarantee their currency, but countries buy and sell gold for various reasons –
transactions that are controlled by international quantity agreements. A recent
accusation against central banks is that they are using such firms as HSBC,
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and Deutsche Bank to manipulate gold
prices in order to make their currencies look more favorable.24 Whatever their
reasons for the purchase and sale of gold, central banks – especially those of
the United States (8,133,500 kg), Germany (3,407,600 kg), Italy (2,451,800
kg), and France (2,435,400 kg)25 – in conjunction with the huge and growing
secondary market, pull market power away from primary producers. Indeed,
annual global primary gold production is less than one-third the size of
America’s gold reserve alone; additionally, secondary production is growing
and, in the U.S., is only 10% smaller than primary production.26 Most
importantly, since gold is priced daily by an external authority, anyone
attempting to raise prices can be instantaneously detected and flushed by
others dumping more on the market as prices rise. Consequently, primary gold
producers do not currently have the ability to appreciably affect the price of
gold on the global market, even though they collectively supply about 50% of
the gold.
Supply will continue to increase as long as mining companies are
able to cost-effectively detect it and remove it from the earth, but the market
will probably remain relatively stable for at least the next few years as gold
companies plan for expansion.27 There are no good estimates of the amount of
gold left in the earth, because finding new deposits requires a great deal of
time and mines generally seek known reserves for only five to ten-year
production increments.However, there are approximately 128,000,000 kg of
23 Gold Fields Mineral Survey, 2009 Annual Gold Survey: Overview 2 (2009).
24 See, “e.g.”, J. Turk, A Short History of the Gold Cartel, GATA.org, http://www.gata.org/node/7402; M.
Gray, Metals Are in the Pits: Trader Blows Whistle on Gold & Silver Price Manipulation, New York
Post, 11 April, 2010, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/metal_are_in_
the_pits_2arTlGNbMK7mb1uJeVHb0O.
25 World Gold Council, World Official Gold Holdings (2010), available at http://www.gold.org/
deliver.php? file=/value/stats/statistics/archive/pdf/World_Official_Gold_Holdings_Mar_2010.pdf.
26 United States Geological Survey, 2010 Mineral Commodity Summaries: Gold 66 (2010).
27 United States Geological Survey, supra note 10, at 31.7.
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known gold deposits, which representa miniscule of the gold in the top four
kilometers of the earth’s crust (the currently-mined range).28 Thus, it is safe to
assume that, as long as economic profits do not fall below zero due to
increased extraction costs, gold mines will be producing for centuries to come.
Demand for gold is fueled by end-markets, including jewelry
manufacturing (68% of demand); electronics, medical, and other industries
(14%); and institutional investing (19%).29 Given that gold has so many
favorable elemental properties, such as its malleability, ductility, non-
corrosiveness, reflectivity, and conductibility, there are no good substitutes
for it in many applications. Gold has become a necessity in the high-tech
industries. In jewelry manufacturing, gold has for millennia been the metal of
choice, even in the face of substitutes such as platinum, silver, zinc, and
copper. As an investment, gold is strong and growing stronger, with
recession-afflicted investors looking to grow their savings by planting them in
nonperishable metals. Overall, demand is not very elastic but varies by
application, with areas such as dentistry seeing more elasticity due to recent
viable substitutes.30 Given that overall demand for gold is relatively inelastic
and that gold is increasingly used as a financial investment by governments
and individuals alike, demand is not likely to decrease anytime soon. Further,
in our technological age that increasingly requires gold for the production of
electronics for the private sector, the military, and personal consumption, it is
likely that demand for gold will rise as time goes by.
5. REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Countries are concerned with more than the competitiveness of the global
market when they impede mergers or break up mining conglomerates. They are
concerned with the gold in their own soil, and the possibility that a single firm
or cartel will acquire rights to all of that gold and then mine it – or fail to mine
it while waiting for higher prices – in a manner that hurts the national economy
or kills jobs. It is conceivable, therefore, that nations look not to the global
market but rather to domestic concerns when deciding how to regulate primary
producers. Such motivations arguably led to the Second Circuit’s antitrust
decision in Consolidated Gold Fields v Minorco.31
28 H. E. Frimmel, Earth’s Continental Crustal Gold Endowment, 267 Earth and Planetary Science Letters
45, 48 (2008).
29 Datamonitor, supra note 7, at 13.
30 Id. at 14-15.
31 J. B. Berman, Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v Minorco, S.A.: The Growing Over-Extension of United
States Antitrust Law 6 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 399 (1991).
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A. Antitrust
No discussion of market concentration and competitiveness in the American
primary gold industry could be complete without a hard look at Consolidated
Gold Fields.32 In that antitrust case involving the potential joining of the
world’s two largest firms, the relevant industry was determined to be primary
producers only – and only those primary producers in the non-Communist
world – even though the court recognized that 1) gold was a fungible product
that was traded between Communist and non-Communist areas and 2) gold
was being recycled and resupplied by the secondary market. The court held
that, since Minorco (a member of the once-powerful Oppenheimer-controlled
gold mines) would have a 32.3% market share in the narrowly-defined market
if it were allowed to join with Consolidated, the hostile takeover bid violated
the Clayton Act and had to be enjoined until the merits of the case could again
be heard. On remand, the injunction stood.33 Consolidated Gold Fields proves
that determining the relevant market for gold mining antitrust cases is of
paramount importance, and that courts might take a narrow view of that market
to protect domestic interests by finding mergers or takeovers illegal. However,
since Consolidated Gold Fields, no U.S. court has found a violation of the
Sherman or Clayton Acts in the gold mining industry. This is unsurprising for
three reasons: first, the Soviet bloc collapsed, expanding the market; second,
the market definition began including secondary producers and other sellers,
such as central banks; finally, no gold conglomerate since Oppenheimer has
come close to such a large share of the global market.
B. Environmental Regulation
Consolidated Gold Fields is the only American gold mining antitrust case in
the last 20 years,34 and mines are not subject to direct economic regulation.
Thus, the bulk of regulatory issues facing mining companies are environmental
and safety concerns. Of the two, environmental regulations – imposed both by
the federal government and by states – have by far the greatest impact on
32 Supra note 12.
33 Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v Anglo American Corp. of South Africa Ltd., 713 F.Supp. 1457
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
34 Although the United States has not been much concerned with anti-competitiveness issues in gold mining,
other countries have. For example, South Africa blocked a merger in 2000 and has been stalling another
since 2009. See SA Government Stops Gold Merger, Mining Journal, 22 September, 2000; M. Creamer,
South African Government Softens Stance on Zstrata-Anglo Merger, Requests Detail,
MiningWeekly.com, 13 July, 2009. The South African government was concerned in these cases that
intra-country competition and job creation would be stifled. This argument is based on the possibility that
a single company or cartel can gain control of all of the gold resources in a nation in order to decrease
production and raise prices. We have already seen that raising prices would be impossible – even for the
gold-rich nation of South Africa – and therefore the mines would have little incentive to decrease
production. The worst that could happen to South African workers would probably be the increase of
capital efficiency through a merger, meaning less of a reliance on labor and, therefore, layoffs.
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American mines, especially in light of the comparative cost advantage that U.S.
regulation gives to mining operations in less-regulated countries.35
Environmental regulations can be strong enough to force gold companies to
avoid exploration in certain areas, to delay operational startup, or even to go
bankrupt. However, mining companies tend to establish operations in those
countries that have the most stable and smoothly functioning governments –
which also tend to be those countries with somewhat strict environmental
laws.36 The tradeoff between effective government-business relations and
exacting environmental laws seems to weigh in favor of government-business
relations. Thus, major players in the mining industry are subject to
environmental regulation almost everywhere they go.
In the U.S., whenever a mining company (or anyone else who wants
to mine) finds gold on federal lands through exploration, it can apply for a
mineral patent with the Secretary of the Interior.37 If on Bureau of Land
Management-managed land (as opposed to National Park Service, Fish and
Wildlife Service, or Forest Service-managed land, where processes are more
stringent), the process of obtaining a patent is quite simple: after receiving the
application, the BLM determines whether gold can be cost-effectively
extracted from the land. If it can, then the mine pays a nominal fee for the
property rights, and the BLM approves the patent, which the Secretary then
reviews and either issues or contests for failing to meet statutory
requirements.38
Once a firm has control of the land, it can begin mining operations –
but not before it clears environmental hurdles.39The most important
environmental laws in this arena are the Clean Air Act, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Comprehensive
35 Environmental regulations in many other gold-rich countries, such as Peru, Indonesia, and South Africa,
are not as stringent or as strictly enforced as those in the United States. Thus, environmental regulations –
just like America’s necessarily higher wages and benefits – put mines in the U.S. at a comparative
disadvantage to operations in many other countries. See,”e.g” A. Kumah, Sustainability and gold mining
in the developing world 14 J. of Cleaner Production 315 (2005); J. L. Sznopek & T. G. Goonan, U.S.
Geological Survey Circular 1197, The Materials Flow of Mercury in the Economies of the United States
and the World (2000); J. S. Ogola, et al., Impact of Gold mining on the Environment and Human Health:
A Case Study in the Migori Gold Belt, Kenya 24 Environmental Geochemistry and Health 141 (2002).
36 Tole & Koop, supra note 9.
37 Most of this section flows from provisions found in the Mining Law of 1872, 30 USC §§22-42 (2006).
This law was passed during a time of little environmental foresight and incentivized expansion in the
West.
38 Mining Law – Approval of a Patent – A Command Performance 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 109 (1995).
For example, in 1994, Barrick obtained 1800 acres of land in northern Nevada from the BLM at the price
of $5 per acre (a total of $9,000). There were an estimated 30,000,000 ounces of readily-extractable gold
at the site – a value of $30 billion. Secretary of the Interior Babbitt, deploring Barrick’s ability to get
astronomically valuable land for a pittance, attempted to halt the patent but lost in court because Barrick
had fulfilled all statutory requirements of the 1872 Mining Law and its amendments.
39 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006), requires that the federal
agencies study a project’s probable environmental impacts before giving the approval necessary for the
project to begin. The agencies issue Environmental Impact Statements before making permitting
decisions if the proposed activity will “significantly affect the quality of the human environment.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (C).
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.40 Under these and
other laws, the mine is required to obtain permits for air quality, water quality,
underground injection, water supply systems, solid and hazardous waste,
wildlife and vegetation protection, surface disturbance, reclamation permits
and bonding, use of toxic chemicals, exploration on Indian lands, and dredge
discharge.41 After receiving the required permits, the mine then must both
comply with them and issue regular updates on contamination levels, surface
disturbances, water discharge quality, etc. The Environmental Protection
Agency and Department of Justice (or states, which also issue environmental
regulations)42 can use administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions to stiffly
penalize a company that does not comply with its permits.
The EPA and DOJ have been stepping up environmental
enforcement for the past decade, and mining companies consequently focus
enormous resources on compliance – resources that add to the cost per ounce
of production.43 However, these resources are – if the enforcement actions are
large enough to eviscerate economic benefits of noncompliance – less than
what the companies would pay if caught violating the law. Whether the
enforcement actions are large enough to remove economic benefits of
noncompliance is unclear, but it is very clear that mines are in many instances
not required to pay the full monetary effect of their actions; the EPA often
strikes a deal with companies rather than driving them into bankruptcy.44
C. Safety Regulations
In addition to environmental regulation, the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 197745 imposes regulations handed down by the Department of Labor’s
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). This agency issues
regulations on everything from personal protective devices to fire suppression
systems, from airborne silica dust to sound levels, and mines are subject to
40 5 R. T. Connery, et al, American Law of Mining §165.03 (2d. Ed. 2008).
41 Id. at §166.1. For a lucid discussion of hard rock bonding practices, see K. Wernstedt & R. Hersch,
Abandoned Hardrock Mines in the United States: Escape from a Regulatory Impasse? 1 WM. & MARY
POL’Y REV. 1 (forthcoming 2010).
42 Many states, such as Nevada and Colorado, enact broad-based, comprehensive environmental regulations
that apply to mines on all private and public lands. Thus, mining companies cannot escape environmental
regulations just because they purchase their property from a private landowner.
43 Id. at §165.03.
44 See Wernstedt & Hersch, supra note 42, at 9. It is difficult to tell whether this relationship is marked by
capture or by normative concerns, but companies’ long-term viability probably plays a role. A famous
EPA/mine case is ASARCO, which closed down many of its regional plants after receiving enormous
fines, but it usually found a way to strike a deal with the EPA so as to stay solvent. For example, in 2003
ASARCO and the EPA set up a joint, $100 million trust fund to clean up all of ASARCO’s past misdeeds
at Superfund sites, even though the task was valued much higher. It wasn’t until 2009, in a Chapter 11
settlement, that the EPA stopped playing pat-a-cake with ASARCO and demanded $1.79 billion to clean
up the company’s mess.
45 30 USC §§ 801 et seq. (2006).
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unannounced inspections. MSHA can impose large fines and can even halt
operation of a mine if safety concerns are not adequately met. Like
environmental regulations, safety regulations are more stringently enforced in
the U.S. than in many other gold-producing countries, creating a comparative
advantage for those countries.
6. COMPETITIVENESS
The gold mining industry is both rivalrous at the large scale and subject to easy
entry at the small scale. Large multinational conglomerates are constantly
jockeying for control of the most underground deposits. They also fight to
lower their costs per ounce and therefore increase their profits, something that
is done both by improving technology and operational efficiency as well as by
discovering or taking over rich ore deposits.
At the small scale, anyone who wants to stake a claim can do so,
assuming the Department of the Interior is convinced that the applicant can
extract gold at a profit; further, everyone who extracts gold from the ground
can sell it at the same daily-fixed price as large firms, although large firms
often hedge. From this perspective, the market is subject to infinite
competition.46 However, large conglomerates are hardly worried about tiny
startups; they are reasonably confident that they are already sitting on the most
lucrative ore deposits in the free world, and are equally confident that they can
buy the smaller operations if need be. Practically, even a small modern mining
operation will require permitting, extraction, electricity, transportation, labor,
milling/leaching, legal, and communications costs – unless the operation is a
tiny artisanal outfit. Even shutting down a mine is costly, given the costs of
environmental cleanup and reclamation, long-term labor agreements, and
dismantling/transporting mills and other capital. However, since gold is
fungible, any production – even at artisanal outfits – competes with large-
scale production.
Even given free entry and a fungible product, “rivalry” is probably a
better term than “competition” to describe the interaction among the world’s
top mining companies.47 Each company is trying to expand, which means that
they must either find previously unknown ore deposits or take over other
companies’ deposits. In order to get into a position to swallow smaller fish,
gold companies scramble to expand their in-ground reserves and make their
operations more efficient. However, much of this rivalry is dispersed due to
many large companies’ expansion into other minerals. For instance, Newmont
Gold, like Kennecott, has recently begun mining copper. This diversification
(along with the likely attendant economies of scope) lessens the degree to
46 Datamonitor, supra note 7, at 13–15.
47 Datamonitor, supra note 7, at 15.
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which existing companies can compare balance sheets and makes merger or
takeover more complicated.
Overall, gold mines produce a single, indistinguishable good, cannot
affect the price of that good, and are subject to the relatively easy entry of
competitors. Thus, the industry is, at the small scale at least, competitive. 
7. CONCLUSION
The gold mining industry is dominated by relatively few large players with
global market shares of at least 1%. However, only one mining company,
Barrick, has a market share over 10%. Even if the global market were more
concentrated, gold mining companies would not likely be able to control the
global gold prices. Further, although entry is relatively free, long-run minimum
efficient scale is high enough to allow in only well-capitalized firms, while
small firms either quit or sell out. Large firms deal with each other as rivals,
with each attempting to control the most and best-concentrated ore deposits,
but even this rivalry is being diffused as companies expand into other mineral
markets. Finally, the impact of regulations – including the impact of
comparative cost disadvantages for U.S. mines – comes mainly from
environmental and safety strictures, but countries may have an idiosyncratic
incentives to protect domestic interests through antitrust. 
